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The people of tie state of Texas, in tAe exer.cise of
t*1eir sovereign power, Aave made an invoAintary appropri-
ation ad dedication of a portion of a man's property to tie
use of 'ihimself and family; and by tie organic law of the
State twiis property is not subject to forced sale. {e still
owns Vie property but uis power of disposition is limited.
This idea of thie appropriation of a portion of a man's
property, in some rases aginst ais will,' is an old one.
The dower righit of tCue wife wxiicA by statute gives te
widow, for Aer life, one taird interest in er Ausband' s
reality, aginst creditors, is an examp'e. It mignt also
be interesting to enquire if te modern homestead is not
simply an extension of want was anciently called hae widow's
quarantine. In 1&agtia COiarta, Chap. 7, we fined it provides
3tiat tie widow sAiall tarry in t ie cief Aouse of Aer 
iusbaad
for forty days after -iAs deatAt, witin wviicA. time dower
sha 1 ' be assigned unto her, w1.icki time in aw is called
quarantine. 'But some liave said that by tie ancient law
of England tie woman sould continue a wnole year in 
1ier
1jusband's "ouse witiin wlic'I time if dower was not assignedj
sne migit recover it, and t iis was certainly tAe,.law of
England before tie conquest." (1)
towever tvis mnay be, Texas was tie first State in tie
Union to pass a %omestead law, aad in 1.839 statutes were
enacted creating tie exemptio.. T .is legi Tation Aas
been followed i varying forms in most of tie States and
one noticeable fact is, tat he exemptions are more exor-
bitant arid extravagant h~an in otner sections of the Un ion.
(1) Coke Lit. 32 b.
4In the South it was claimed t'qat tqe devastating in.f'uevace
of tqe Civil War created Vie ecessity for te passage of
tiese laws wiici are, in many respects, opposed to t'ie
fundamental principles of our government.
Viewed in te light of experience, it is to be feared
tiat principles and policies, not ot.erwise pernaicious,
dictated the passage of these laws. Thuey were passed,:
primarily, for tie protection of tie debtor; but justice de.
mands tat Vie creditor s-qould also be protected. Tie
rig'its of-tie creditor seem to Aave been lost sigit of
wien te law made it possible for te debtor to take refuge
behaind tkiese exemption laws and sAun tie payment of i-is
hionest debts. hief Justice mars-qalJ, in Ogden v. saun-
der's, said h at hke tendency of tiese 1aws was to "impair
,commercial intercourse an~d t~lreate. the existance of credit."
Let us see iow this can be. In h~e first place capitalist
5do not seek investments in. sections of toie country wiere tIe
payment of just debts can be so easily avoided. Rates of
interest will be Aigiler, and even 1ome capital will be in-
vested elsewrere owing to te destruction of confidence in
business transactions. Ten per
aL
tVoug'At to be a moder - c iarge.
amusing, as well as instructive
cause of tliis? TAere is in tie
about two and a ialf million and
to iave as exempt property : two
upon wwiicl no value is set or a
cent interest in Texas is
Now would it not be an
task to enquire in to Ve
State a population of
ean family is entitled
Aundred acres of lamd,
lot or ors not to exceed
in value five tiousand dollars; but for coavenience thiis
may be taken for toie average value.
Allowing five people to constitute a famiy and sup-
posing eac family ownes a Aorestead, w.ic . of course is
not tLe case, we can find by multiplyiag tie va'.ue of tie
6hqomestead by tie number of families, te amount of exempt
property in hte State. The great bulk of tqe business of
t?'le country is transacted oyi a credit basis and is it not
t.e wit'i.drawirig, as a basis of credit, of suc-I a vast amount
of property one of 'i e causes of a Aigi rate of interest ?
Viewed in this lighit, it is not difficult to see tnat it
would be beneficial to tie State to legislate more ia favor




The Constitution of tie State of Texas declares-
First, -The legislature sial)- iave power, and it skal- be
tAeir duty, to protect by law from forced sale a certain
portion of te property of all .ieads of failies.
Second,- The iomestead of a famil.y ot to exceed two iundred
acres of land (not included in a city, town, or villiage)
or any city, town, or villiage Iot or lots not to exceed
fifty dollars in value at te time of tieir destination as
a Aomestead, and wit-tout reference to he value of any
improvements tiereon, siall not be subject to forced sale
for debts, except tey be for te purclase mo.ney hiereof,
for t*ie taxes assessed t-Lereon, or for te labor and mater-
ials ex.pended thereon..
Third,- Nor s-tall h~e owner, if a married man, be at liberty
8to alienate t1Ae same unless by consent of t'e wife and in
sucli manaer as may be prescribed by law. (1)
The Constitution of 1878 makes tie fo.6owing addi-
tional provisions relating to iomestead exemptions - No
mortgage, trust deed o- oter lien on t.e nomestead siall
ever bp valid except for tie purciase money tAerefor or
improvements made tiereou as teretofore provided, wetter
su&i mortgage or trust deed, or otier lien siall 'ihave been
created by iusband alone or together witA i %is wife and
all pretended sales of'tie _omestead involving any condit-
ion of defeasance sk'all be void. (2)
(IM) Constitution of Texas, 1869, At- XII. sec.a5.
(2) Constitution of Texas, 1876, Art. XVI. sec.50.
9- 10
I0MESTEAD DEFIbAED •
A homestead aecessavily Pi cudes ttle idea of a 'iou.e
for residemce or naasion %ouse. I Famk'1ia v. Coffee,
18 Texas 413, it is furtLer said tiat" tie dwel'iag may
be a sple.did marislom oro  a mere cab in., or teat, oreu to thie
winds aad Vie raias of eavea." If tiere be eithier, it is
under tie protection of t-e law, but tVere must be a iome
residence before tje two 'uundred adjoinin.g acres can be
c'aimed as a iomestead."
17
lTOW DESIGNATED .
The general doctrine is t'iat an actual reside-vce
is required to impress upon tAe premises tte caracter of
a -ionestead- buL in tiis State no suCo residenc 1is required;
nor is it absolutely essentia- t iat a hiouse be built or
improvements be made. There must be a preparationh to im-
prove and if tAtis is of suci a cbqaracter as to manifest
beyo-id doubt an. inteatioa to occupy te premises as a 'jome-
stead, it is sufficient. (1)
(1) Franklin. v. Ooffeee. ( 18 Texas 413. )
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LIITAT IONS.
T ie limitation of a rural tomestead i s acres wii1 e that
ia a town or city is value. It will. be noticed tiat te
Constitution says aoti-iag about te value of thre two A.undred
acres w~itc. it allows to be dedicated as a -qomestead and it
specially provides hiat the lot or lots in a town or city
used as a Aorestead sall not exceed in value five tousand
doIla"s, C $ 5000.) exclusive of any improvements wtici may
placed tieveon. The agencies of wea- and development
may increase tie value of a iomestead indefinitely, sti,!
so 7o~ig as it is used as suc_. it is exempt from the payment
of a!.! debts except those mentioned in the ostitution.
So a debtor, owaing in a town or city, a "lot or lots" not
exceeding in vanue five housaid do~l~a may p0ace improve-
rments thereon worth mill.ions of dollars but wq-ici are, -aeve -.
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t"ieIess, beyoad, tAe reacl of creditors. The wisdom of suci.
exemptions as tiese may be questioned. The Aomestead ex-
emptioyi laws Aave been claracterized as "wise ard benefi-
cait" aad i-a teir gevera' features Uey e uridoubtedJy are,
but it seems coatrary to public policy to permit a persoa
to iave tbe absolute owaer.s-iip of property and at t same
time to Aave tie accumulations aad profits derivable tAere-
from placed beyond tae eaca of just creditors.
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WIAT IS INCLUDED IN TIE WORD "FAMILY".
Tte term family in tne Cotitution is used in its
g ,eneric sease, embracing, a ioushold composed of parents and
c'iildree, or oLier 'elatives or domestics and servants, in-
so"'t every collective body of persons living toget-ier witei
tie same ourtilevre, subsisting icommo, directing tAeir
attention to a cotom object-tie promotion. of tvieir mutual
i,.terests and social appimess. (1)
(1' Wilson v. Cochran, ( 31 Tex. 677.)
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RURAL, MlIXED AND URBAN 10ISTEADS.
in manY instaaces in ttis State, t-je corporate limits
of Lowas aad. villages iave been extended so as to include
tie wiole or a part of lands previously used 
as a rural.
'Iomestead. Tlis is a question of great importance 
to per-
sons "aviag iomesteads near te corporate limits of 
rapidly
growing towns and cities.
Tie decisions in t'lis State seem to be uniform, tA.at
#tere tqe corporate 1imits of t-e town or city ,.ave been
extended so as to include a rural iomestead, t iis of itself,
does not o Lange t ie caracter of tie iomestead, "not Until tte
plan or plot of t*te town. is extended a cordinrgly, eit-ter by
buildin.gs or survey, or at least an ordinayce estt-bliaing
streets &c.." (1)
In ti is case tie extension of tie town limits subse-
(1) Taylor v. Bou'-ware, ( 17 Texas 7,4.)
quearly to tqe acquisition of tie place iva question as a
qomestead in cluded a portion of tie land, on wOi.icA portion
was situated t,e residence of tAe owner. A judgment was
obtained aginst tie debtor and tie land was sold under
execution. The question to be decided by tie court was,
"could tie debtor's %omestead be restricted to the portior.
of t* v l aad taken in by he extension of tie town limits
and on Wqicn stood 'is residence." The court decided tiat
tie 'tomestead was not restricted to t' e ' and in eluded in
t'ie extension of te town limits, My. Justice Lipscomb,
delivering te opinion if te court reason ed as follows.-
"The protection of U e iomestead from forced sale was no doubt
a favorite object wit ihe convention, anud the constitutional
provision intended to insure Liat object, ias been re~arded as
entitled to a l-ibe~'a. co.nstuction. The term "1 ot or lots"
used in tie %nostitution must be taked and conustrued in the
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popular sense of t~iose terms; and, wien so used, never
would be considered as embracing land witl1in t--ie jurisdic-
tioaal limits of tie corporatioa, not connected wit'i t1-e p'an
of tle city# It mign.t be important to te admiaistration
of Liue police laws of tlie corporation that suci lands aad
t~iose w-o owaed and occupied tA-em, srould be witiin its
jurisdiction: but until streets ,.ave been extended t-Arougi.
Vie 'and connectiag it witA tie plan. of the town, tAe land
could not be called a lot of Cie towm."
Tie same conclusion is reacied in tie important case
of Basset v. 7lessyler, (30 Texas 604.), but by a course of
reasonihg not avialogous nor by any means as sound as tat
given in te case of Taylor v. Boulware, sup&,,
Th~e court says h at hae authority to subject to tax'-
ation for municipa'. purposes the proper ty of those W2o a-re
opposed to ti e extension of t'.e townu limits shou .d not be
18
given to tqe iniqabitants of a town by a vote of two tVirds
of tAei r numbe". If suc. were tie case, it would always
be perilous to own a lomestead of two Aundred acres in proX-
imity to otie of tese towns or villages, because tqe tempta-
tion of tese corporatioas to absorb tiese rural omesteads
for purposes of taxation and for augmenting tie local rev-
enue, mig1t be to strong to be witnstood, and p"ivate rigits
already vested under constitutional law migqt be lessened,
varied atid impaired, at tqe caprice, tP.e wiim, or tVe greed
of a body of individuals, vlo mighit accompi- w,.wat tAe
legislature itself would be inacompetent to do." And. t e
court furtqer intimates tiat if tbqe husband sgould consent
to suci. extesion, t ie assent of tip wife would nave to be
obtained in writing before t te c'lange in t' Le chlaracter of
t~ie %omes'tead would be complete and! fial.
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OrIARACTFR OF TIF INTEREST.
The mere occupaicy of a place as a iomestead canges
t'ie c.aracter of tie estate iv O alifornia, It i( converted
into a kind of joiat tenacy wit* t'ae igit of survivorsip
between iiusiaad avd wife. (1) But it seems to be tie better
doctrine to 'old tiat tie 1'omestead interest is not a defin-
ite estate in tie landq tierefore not subject to ahienation
nor is its value capable of being appraised by a creditor
and setapart for Ais benefit iA. execution proceedin.1-s. (2)
In tAis State tle prime object of tie Constitution
is kept constantly in view. hat object being to secure a
iomestead to tie family. The rigqts and inte"ests of
eithIer he hiusband or wife are not ctanged by he possession
(fl 4 Ca'ifornia 268.
(2) 28 Vermont 544.
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and occupancy of t-te premises as a -tomestead, tie title re-
mains iaci.aaged a-id no irifri*gmeat upon property is made
futvr t.an is necessary to carry out tAe object design ed.(l)
(1) Stewart v. lIackey, (16 Texas 56.)
WIAT ARFP TIE RIGTS OF TIF FA1ILY
Ii TIE 01ISTEAD ?
The c~aracter of Vie iiterest wiicl tie farily of tie
debtor as in tie a'omestead is sometiting more t-ian a mere
ciance of beinag protected. The family .as a rigqt in depen-
dent of tie debtor, t-erefore ie cai-ot waive tiei'r rigits and
lessen tie benefits intended to be conferred upon tiem.
Tie husband and wife may by deed of trust duly executed
and ackaow-edted in tie manlier prescribed by law, legally
encumber ie iome stead to secure Vie payment of a debt,
tie sale of tie trustee not being a forced sale.
22
FORCED SALE.
The Oonstitutio after describing t.e limits of tqe
-iomestead, says:-It "stall not be subject to forced sale
for debts, except t iey be for tae purclase moaey t~iereof,
fo?' tie taxes assessed tAereoi, or for labor and materials
expended tiereoa." By "a forced sale" is meant a sale under
judicial process, done in accordance wit tie law regulating
suci sales. "Therefore tie omestead which is exempted
by the Constitution from 'forced sale' cannot be sold under
process of the court, a;ad it matters not wiat form the
contract assumes, nor how willing te head of the family
may bq, it is an imnunity conferred by the Constitution for
tie purposes beyond t ie mere pleasure of the individual
and cannot be renounced." (I)
This same case ho _ds that the husband, withq the as-
(-1) Simpson & Keene v. Williamson, (6 Texas '01.)
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seft of te wife in the form prescribed by law, may make
an absolute sale of tie omestead or may mortgage it to be
sold on default, but t'e power of sale must be vested in
tie mortagee because"a mortgage depending for its enforce-
mont on judicial process would be inefectual for hie reason
that it would be forced."
This exemption from forced sale, tqougA, seems to apply
o-ly so long as Vhe premiees are Aeld and occupied as a Aome-
stead and as soon' as tie property is abandoned and anotier
Aomestead acquired te mortgage may be foreclosed by judic-
ial process. And it 1.as been ield tiat after te abandon-
ment te mortagees 1ien in a suit of foreclosure is to be
given tie preference over all otier creditors, he mortgage
taking effect as a 2ienu he moment h~e hiomestead is aban-
do ned.• (I)
(I) Stewart V. Mackey, (16 Texas 56.)
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ARE LIENS UPOi4 TIE I01ESTEAD GOOD ?
The Costitution of 1875,, ays:-"No ruG'tgrage, trust
deed or otier len on. tie %omestead s~all ever be valid
except for" tie purcase oiriey t'ereof, or improvements tiereoa,
as in Aereinrbefore provided, wetAer sucA mortgage, or trust
deed oy other lien ( slia 11  ave been created by t-e %usba.d,
aloie, or toget'-er witi ,is wife; and al] pretended sales
of tie iomestead) in volviag any condition of defeasance
s al- be void."
Notwitistanding tie above Constitutional provision
tie contract of tie iusbard to convey tie land used and
occupied as a Aomestead, wit;iout te wife's concurran.ce
is not void. This was so ie d in Stewart v. lackey, (16
Texas 57), wien tie court says--"The omly question. is,
wietier tie mortgage, tiouga inefectual at t'ie time of
executio i could be enforced subsequently, anud after tie
25
hiomestead Wqic"I as been mortgaged, was abandoned aad an-
ot*er one acquired*....... T~e entire object of tie law
and Co.astitution is to secure a hiomestead and no infriage-
meat upo tyie vusband's rig.ts and property, except sucaq as
may be necessary for thte object designed, is intended by the
law or is to be pTesumed. Under t-Ais view, tie Tiusband
may la conformity witi. te law, make any disposition w iateve~r
of tie homestead, being his own property, provided Ais act
does not interfere wit-i t1.e absolute enjoyment avid use of
tAe, Aomestead by tie usban.d, wife, and. famityy" By t'is
decision it wiII be seen tnat tie usband may mortgage tie
%iomestead witiout tIe consent of tie wife, "subject to tie
coatinfincies tiat tie nomestead may not be cpiangd" c..
According to t*e modern th eoy of mortgages, property
is not alienated wien mortgaged. Tie mortgage serves only
as a 1ienu upon tie premises. ut ii the case of a mortgage
26
on a %omestead w"erein lies te force of tie iei. Take a
case wiere Vie usband does mortgage Vie omestead subject
to te conditioas meationed in. tie Crostitutioa. Wat
possible benef it can. accrue to tqe iusbaad from suc' t a mor-
tgage ? Subsequent cases *ave up'ned tie doctrine of te
case quoted above, but as stated, it does not seem consis-
t'ant to tie Constitution. The Costitution says Vie mort-
gage s'ial. be void, yet these cases liold tAat, alt'oug"I ie
mortgage is void wen given, and continues to be a nullity
so 'ong as tie premises are 4eld as a *iomestead, yet tie
moment tAe omestead is. abondoied, te lien created by hVe
mortgage springs into life, and 'ias full force and effect
as t1ioug"i valid from its incipiaacy.
A']ien. given. upon land before it is dedicated or
occupied as a 1omestead is riot impaired by tie debtor subse-
quenut~y occupyirig h~e 1anud as a hiomestead. In tie case of
Oi.ipman v. i.fc Kiney (41 Texas 76), tie 'usband conveyed a
lot wlaic-i was community property, to a trustee to secure a
debt. T e nusband afterwards occupied tie lot as a aiome-
stead and in a suit brou kt by the trustee for t~e enforce-
ment of tiAe trust it was aeid that t-e occupation of tie lot
subsequent to its conveyance to tie trustee did not exem.pt
it from foreclosure, and sale to satisfy t1.e trust.
The above rule seems to apply oaly in case of a vol-
unta~y lien bping given by tie debtor. It does aot apply in
tie case of a statutory lien of a judgment upon the reality
of tie debtor. Tis i5 siown in the decision in ti e case
of Stone v. oDame 1 , ( 20 Texas I')wiere t.e praiatiff
purchiased the land at a sale under aa execution atinst t ie
defendant, and the defense was that the premises were the
defendant' s 'iorestead. * Ven levy was m~ade tiere was no
sett~emaent upon The land. Hut after tne 1evy was made and
28
before the date of tte sale the defendant built a 'iouse on
tVe land avid, moved into it tqree days previous to te sale.
The judge cqarged tie jury:-"Tiat if tie proof siows tiat at
tie date of t .e sieriff's sale tie defendaat an f family re-
sided o a tie tract of Iand, tien it was Iis iomestead, and
exempt from forced sale. T.e tine of tie sale is tie time
to wiici we must look in ascertaining tie fact of omestead
or not." This doctrine was affirmed in tie case of I-Aac
1aius v. Oampbell, (37 Texas 267.1, in Wiic. case it was
ield that a debtor wio Ias no 1omestead may acquire one
witi . al its immunity from sale under judgments agiist *Ihim,
and it is irmaterial t iat t~e judgments were in existance
Wien Ie acquired tie iomestead; and t.ese principles are
app~ice~ble to a debtor whio, iavinF a >omestead of less value
or extent than tke 1ega1 maximum enlarges it to hke maximum."
29
VENDOR' S LIE N.
The homestead is not exetipt from sale for juiginent
obtained for Vie purciase moaey. This question was decided
in te case of Farmer v. 0imp(;on, (6 Texas 393.1 where it
is said tat,"a homestead is not acquired until tie title
to te land oa wiicq suc. 1omestead is estab lsied, is ac-
quired or until tie party is in a position to demand title.
and al lieas acquired before tve omestead as been estab-
-isied must be raised o, it will be subject to a forced sale
for t-the satisfactio n of suc-. liens. The vendee does not get
a vood titi.e until t ie purclase money debt is discijarged.
te gets no such. an estate in lands as will support t,.e right
of tomestead agiast t)e person to wiom te purcAase money
is due. The otistitution says t~at t~'e exempt port ion of
reality s' all not be a source fo t~ payment of debts.
30
T.e debtor's property is not witidrawa absolutely and is made
inapplicabIe to te compuIsory payrneaL of debts. Tils
fieiag te case iow can judgments be lieas at all on t iis
exempt po"tioa of realty ? Tie ovganic law of he State
witidraws a portion of tie debtor's propp~ty from tie 'ihold
of tie creditor, and so long as it i§ occupied as a ionestead
no lien can attaci. Ivi Black v. Fipperson, (40 Texas 162.),
it is "iheld, tat, a debtor can sell i6 otestead avd with
Vte proceeds of the sale acquire anotbier 'iomestead without
subjecting t ie abandoned to 1.as general debts, the vendee
taking agirst he judgment creditors wno ot.*erwise would
have a lien. This is manifestly rig-it and just toward the
vendee for 'e would Aavc no reason to believe tiat te mere
buyinug of tiae land would bring into activity a judgment lien
Wici ad iitn erto been a ulity. If the vendee did not
31.
take as agimst hie judgment creditors -e would ave to sat-
isfy tie lienm wiici was made operative te moment hie land
came into "tis possessiov-, else te vendor's creditor could
take th.e land under te lien. It will be tus seem that hie
vendee might be forced to pay for L'qe 'a-ad twice, if te
law were ot"herwise.
BORROWED MONEY TO PURC{ASE IOMESTEAD.•
The purciased property is always liable w ere a vendee
borrows money to pay for t1.e omestead. \Tien a vendee gives
uis note for tCe purcihase money and te vendor assigns Vie
note, tue assigiment carries wih it hie vendor's lien. (1)
But Vie vondor's lien does not arise in favor of a third
party wjo pays te purclase money to te vendor for tie
purc.aser and takes te latter's note for Lue amount.
An interesting case oq tiVis point is tiat of malone v.
Kaufmen, (38 Texas 456.), lugAes sold a lot to 1Valome taking
two motes of I.a l o-e as part of t-le purcuase price of vie lot.
11.alone and wife also executed a deed of trust for -{uvles'
benefit, te p operty bteing made a liomestead, two tuousand
dollars being still due oaV he otes, at hie request of
(1) -4oore v. R aymond, (15 Texas 554.)
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Malone, K1aufman, Vie appellee, advanced hie money to l4alole
to take up tie notes. IiA coasideration for t-is advance-
ment 141alone executed two notes to Kaufman and he and 'viis
wife executed a deed of trust to secure Kaufman in tiis
advancemeat. 0 default of payment, Kaufman broug tthis
suit for te foreclosure of te vendor's lien on h te prop.
erty as a Aomestead. teld:-"ThaL tlere was no vendort's
lien secured in t'e contract and no cause of action." The
,court said Vhat te moment tie money was paid to the holder
of Uiqe purchiase toney notes, no matter werace derived, hie
purciase money was paid and the vendorls lien on the lot was
dis carged. It would Aave been oterwise if Kaufman ad
dealt directly wit. the o'der of the purciase money notes,
paid %.is money to '.im as purchaser of the ,n(,tes. T-te
vendor Us lien would then 'tave inuured to -tim as ant inciden t
to the notes. But inu not dea]img wih, tie %o'der of the
34
purchiase money aotes, e made a new contract, not a contract
for t'.e purci.ase money but for loaned morey and tqis new
conitract was not sucL an one as to subject t'ie iomestead
to forced sale, wiatever may have been the intenton of tie
parties to te cotract at tqe time for Vi ereason t-'iat,
"t-e vendor's lien is n.ot the creature of t'lie contract but is
an incident to a contract for t'te purchase of raad, growing
out of that specific Tkind of contract by operation of law.
35
ARE TIE PROCF:DS OF TE SALE OF
TIE I01ESTFAD EXETPT ?
To tqis question it may be said tiat neitqer tqe Con-
stitution nor any statute provides for such sale, therefore
it may be said tat wien a hiomestead is voun-tarily exctan-
ged for money, property wiici is not exempt under he law,
no protection can be claimed under the exemption laws for he
money received in exciange. ( The reason for te rule
whiici subjects to forced sale property not exempt by statute
wihicli tas been received in vo.thntary exciange for otqer
property wiicA was exetipt, is that hie statute fixes hie
character of the exemption and not the chioice and caprice
of t'e debtor. (2)
(1) Wiittemburg v. Lloyd, (49 Texas 633.)
(2) Sck,,eider v. Bray1 (59 Texas 669.1
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Ii t~is state an insolvent debtor can pur1'caSe a 1ome-
stead witAi money would otherwise be distributed amolg '-Ls
creditors. The case of North V. S'i"earn, (.15 Texas 174.1),
settled this ques-tion as to debts created prior to tie
acquisition of tie omestead.
The passage of t'ie homestead exemption aWs cannot
impair te validity of liens subsisting prior to such pas-
sage. Otierwise a State migit pass an enforce a law which
would be ia conflict with. te clause of the Constitution
wic'n proiibits a State from passing any l aw impairing tte
obligations of conatracts.
Gun v. Barry, (- WalIace 610.), is a leadinF case.
It is there eld tiat any homestead or otiler exemption law
W~iich attempts to divert valid ]liens existing at t: e date of
its passage is Unconstitutional and void.
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WAIVER OF ISTEAD*
The organic law of tiis State declares tiat tie iomie-
stead property shiall not be sold under execution. In this,
tqe Constitution executes itself, and t ae provision canaot
be waived. No officer of tbhe Jaw can levy upon and se I such.
property. But this provisiona of t-qe Constitution sould
not be construed to interfere witi the sale of tlie property
or iomestead !y t e 1ead of tlie family wit. tqe consent of
the wife. There seems to. be noo limit to the power of con-
veyance or disposal of the homestead wit, the formal legal
corselt of the wife. (1)
We see ten, that tie 1omestead is not exempted abso-
lutely, but te're exists the right to claim the exemption.
Jordon v. Peak, (38 Texas 429.)( 1)

